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7 FEB 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Reconnaissance, CIA

SUBJECT

: Proposed Statement of Mission and Manning Concept for the NRO Staff

- 1. We find the proposed charge to the NRO Staff generally broad enough in scope to accommodate the basic needs for outlining the responsibilities and functions of the Staff. We definitely agree with the philosophy suggested and note the following minor observations.
  - a. We contend that the role of the SOC is unique enough to warrant reporting directly to the Director and Deputy Director, NRO and not fall within the organizational schema of the NRO Staff per se. We should refrain from raising the old bones from the closet relative to the merits of returning the SOC to the Director of Central Intelligence, however, we do invite your attention to memorandum to the DCI of 7 July 1965 regarding the reasons for returning the SOC to CIA

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- b. In addition to enjoining the NRO Staff to refrain from exercising contracting authority, we also feel that it should not proffer contract direction or technical direction to contracts as it is presently doing under a contract with GE for computer support to the SOC. Additionally, the direction given to Eastman-Kodak on the processing and film contracts falls into this category.
- c. We are not convinced that the Director, NRO Staff position should be reserved for the Air Force, but it could well circulate among the services, including CIA. There obviously would be some cover obstacles to evercome;

NRO review(s) completed.

however, we trust that none would be insurmountable if the desire to rotate the directorship was prevalent. The Security position, however, because of the DCI's responsibility for security policy should, of course, be manned by CIA. While there is some logic in placing the Control Board for film production, et cetera, under the DD/NRO. we would hope that it would not consume too much of his time nor divert his attention from the over-all management of the entire NRP. As we look at the NRO presently, we find the Director, NRO an Air Force man; a Special Technical Assistant also an Air Force man; and who de facto if not de jure has been blessed with the power to approve and disapprove NRO programs, to wit, CIA's R&D efforts. Moreover, the Director, NRO Staff is an Air Force officer as is a high percentage of the NRO positions. Additionally, Dr. Flax's Executive Officer is an Air Force officer, and we find Colonel Worthman acting in the absence of General Stewart as the Director, NRO Staff. Reviewing this roster of Air Force personnel, we find some difficulty in assuring ourselves that the NRO Staff cannot help but have a blue suit complexion, and, if the one powerful CIA representative, i.e., the Deputy Director, NRO, is sidetracked into carrying out functions and responsibilities which are limited in scope, then we have some cause for concern.

- 2. Although we do not have the specifics regarding the functions as referred to in Tab A, we wish to direct the following comments to the NRO Staff functions and responsibilities as set forth in Tab C of the 20 December 1965 draft paper prepared by General Stewart and which, we understand, will form the basis for the referenced Tab A.
  - a. Responsibilities of the Director, NRO Staff We question the advisability of granting the Director, NRO Staff the quihority to sign for the Director or Deputy Director, NRO

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in his absence. To do otherwise would not be in keeping with the concept of the NRO Staff as outlined in your proposed "Statement of Mission and Manning" responsibilities. Additionally, we question the authority of the Director, NRO Staff to approve need-to-know access to security information. Rather, the need-toknow should be approved by the Program Director, or, on occasion, by the Director, NRO himself. As has been the case historically, the specific granting of clearances will be covered by the Security Task Group which, we understand, was to be set up by Dr. Flax; and, hence, to include such authority under the NRO Staff function might be presumptuous as well as premature. Regarding the establishment of launch sheedules, we contend that this be the sole responsibility of USIB, and the NRO through the SOC be merely responsive to USIB dictates with due consideration for operational and weather contingencies.

- b. Responsibilities of the Chief, Security Officer, NRO Staff (Reference, page 3, paragraph e) The interpretation of NRO security policy as well as criteria should rest with the Program Directors in following the guidance emanating from the DCI through the NRO. Regarding paragraph g, it is necessary for the Program Director to concur in the "must-know" and not the Director, NRO Staff if the Program Directors are at all to maintain any semblance of security control over their programs.
- c. Responsibilities for the Deputy for Operations Herein the Deputy for Operations has been charged with conducting numerous analyses and studies. To adequately perform such tasks, the Deputy for Operations would be required to build a capability not presently existing in the NRO. Furthermore, in most of these areas, it is our contention that the

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NRO Staff not be charged with such responsibilities but rather an appropriate Program Director. Our particular areas of concern are (1) analysis of photographic and SIGINT intelligence collection requirements and priorities as compared with the collection capability, (2) climatological studies of areas of intelligence collection interest. (3) analysis to determine the extent of collection realizable from orbiting SIGINT satellites, and (4) cumulative analysis of target coverage obtained as compared to use of collection requirements. Such studies are indeed essential to the conduct of operations; however, they need not be conducted by the NRO Staff but rather by the Program Directors most knowledgeable of the operating systems.

Of particular concern is Item I under paragraph H which requires the Deputy for Operations to conduct cumulative analysis of target coverage. While the Deputy for Operations must have precise and timely information on the status of target coverage, he is not in a good position to determine the degree to which USIB requirements are being met. Furthermore, there are other responsible Government components (e.g., the PWG) which have a legitimate interest in this information. There should be one central data file continuously updated by information from NPIC and NSA which satisfies the requirements of the NRO Staff, the D/NRO, the DCI, and USIB. This data file is most logically maintained in the CIA data processing facility.

Also of some concern is paragraph 2 in section H. In this paragraph the Deputy for Operations is assigned the responsibility for recommending changes in the operational capabilities support by appropriate analyses to improve capability for meeting USIB requirements. It should not be the province of the NRO Staff to conduct such analyses. Furthermore, it is more logically the purview of the Deputy for Research and Development, rather than the Deputy for Operations, to insure that such analyses are taking place and to maintain knowledge of the progress and results of these analyses.

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The general tenor of the section assigning responsibilities to the Deputy for Operations seems to assume that the Deputy for Operations will, in essence, take deliveries of hardware manufactured by NRP participating agencies and then develop operation procedures for the utilization of this hardware. This implied procedure reveals a prevalent misconception concerning the development of collection systems to meet established requirements. It is properly the role of the agency charged with the development of a given collection system to provide for the delivery of a complets operating system which includes not only hardware but all the supporting command and control software and operational procedures applicable. If the developing agency must view its task only as building hardware to be used in a manner determined by a separate component, then we are inevitably doomed to gross inefficiency in meeting USIB requirements. It is only possible to design and build efficient collection hardware specifically tailored to an established set of operational procedures. It is incumbent upon the Deputy for Research and Development to insure that the developing agency is taking proper account of all the considerations which bear both on the hardware and its associated operating procedures. It should be the responsibility of the Deputy for Operations only to understand how to utilize a given system and to provide for provision of properly trained personnel to execute these operational procedures.

d. Responsibilities of the Deputy for Processing and Resources - Heretofore, most NRO aircraft support, as well as considerable support for the satellite operations, was received through the good offices of General Geary. This mechanism has worked most excellently, and we are loathe to entertain any thought that this excellent support would be replaced.

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a. Responsibilities of the Deputy for Research and Development - The responsibilities as outlined in the draft paper for the Deputy for Research and Development in our view are an impossible mixture of staff and quasi-line functions. Implied in this delineation of responsibilities is a most imprecise distinction between the roles of the Government agencies participating in the NRP under the general direction of the D/NRO and the role of the NRO Staff per se. The proper role for the agencies participating in the NRP is to provide capability for action that the D/NRO must have at his disposal. It is the role of the NRO Staff only to expedite communications between the D/NRO and those action agencies in the NRP. There is no requirement for the NRO Staff to duplicate the functions and responsibilities that must necessarily reside with the participant agencies.

Paragraph 1 under section A assigns to the Deputy for Research and Development the responsibility for planning and executing a program for research studies, development, and production of components and systems. It is clearly the role of the agencies participating in the NRP to plan and execute the programs mentioned above. Insefar as the D/NRO requires information concerning these plans and programs, it is the legitimate role of the NRO Staff to gather this information from the participating agencies and to organize it for the D/NRO's use, but not to plan and execute these programs. It is also, perhaps, a proper role for the Deputy for Research and Development to formulate for the D/NRO approval guidance and direction to be issued to the participating agencies, but again, not to respond by planning and executing programs which follow from this direction.

Paragraph 3 implies that the Deputy for Research and Development is to maintain full knowledge of all resources

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> (presumably technical and engineering) and to review recommendations for new developments made by the NRP participating agencies. It is the proper role of the participating agencies to maintain full competence and knowledge to advise the D/NRO on the best and most efficient means for satisfying the requirements as formulated by the D/NRO. It is not only wasteful but, in general, bad management practice for the D/NRO to maintain equal confidence on his personal staff. If the D/NRO is not prepared to accept recommendations from the participating agencies, he should take steps to enhance the confidence of these agencies, not to duplicate such capabilities in what is properly a staff organization. The D/NRO should not attempt to intrude his staff into the industrial community in parallel with the NRP participating agencies.

Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 refer to "technical requirements. " The term as it is used in these paragraphs does not seem to have a clear and precise meaning. For example, in paragraph 5 the Deputy for Research and Development is charged with maintaining the current projection of the techmical requirements that may be expected to cover the development of future systems. This might be taken as meaning maintaining a projection on the state of the engineering art required to build systems to meet forthcoming USIB requirements. However, in paragraph 6, the Deputy for Research and Development is charged with maintaining a current analysis of the technical requirements imposed by the needs of the intelligence community upon systems in use in the NRP. Clearly technical requirements in this context cannot mean state of the art, engineering, and technical capability. The use of the term "technical requirements" in paragraph 7 would seem to be alluding to particular performance requirements demanded of operational systems. This usage could be consistent with that intended in paragraph 6, but in any

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case it is not a precisely defined term. Both paragraphs 6 and 7 assigned the Deputy for Research and Development the responsibility for conducting some ill-defined analysis. Whatever these may be it would seem far more appropriate for the Deputy for Research and Development not to conduct such analysis but to insure that the responsible NRP agencies are conducting whatever analyses are required.

Paragraph 14 requires the Deputy for Research and Development to prepare documents for dissemination to the exploitation community continuing information on the technical characteristics of photographic collection systems. The Deputy for Research and Development is clearly not in a good position to prepare such documents but rather should only insure that such documents are prepared and preperly disseminated between agencies responsible for the system in question.

PIGNED

JOHN J. CROWLEY
Director
Office of Special Projects

Attachment: a/s

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